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Abstract:
This paper looks at the EU regional policy from the perspective of the new economic
geography. Firstly the paper studies with reference to the new economic geography un-
der which conditions regional integration entails the risk of widening the economic ine-
qualities between regions. Secondly it is examined which policy design should be cho-
sen when aiming at avoiding interregional income disparities while reinforcing integra-
tion. Thirdly it is analysed whether the EU regional policy is - according to the new
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1 INTRODUCTION
A crucial question connected with European integration is whether deepening integra-
tion leads to a ”... strengthening of the core regions accommodating modern production
sectors at the expense of the peripheral regions retaining only traditional and local ac-
tivities.”
1. As a consequence of a changing European economic geography income dis-
parities among the European regions could increase. Obviously the European Union
policy makers are of the opinion that the European integration widens income dispari-
ties between regions: Among other motives they refer to the expected uneven spatial
impact of economic integration as a justification for their regional policy interventions.
2
The scepticism of the European Commission concerning the spatial distribution of inte-
gration gains is reflected in the amount spent on regional policy. While deepening inte-
gration the Structural Funds, which finance the bigger part of regional policy, progres-
sively increased from 3.7 billions in 1985 to 33 billions in 1999 which corresponded to
one third of the EU budget at that point in time.
If we look at a justification for policy interventions while reducing barriers to trade and
factor mobility from a theoretical perspective, until the late eighties arguments for the
European Commission’s rather pessimistic assessment concerning the regional distribu-
tion of integration gains was hard to find in trade and growth theory. Instead, the ‘neo-
classical paradigm’, which implies that regional integration should lead to convergence,
dominated trade and growth theory for several decades. Different from the neo-classical
view point two newer theories - the New Growth Theory
3 and the New Economic Geog-
raphy - throw doubt on the opinion that integration always is a vehicle for convergence.
Those economic approaches suggest that integration may, depending on the concrete
circumstances, encourage divergence or convergence.
The theoretical result that regional integration may cause income disparities among re-
gions entails far-reaching policy implications. Out of those this paper discusses what we
can learn for regional policy from the New Economic Geography (NEG). The NEG of-
fers a framework for studying the spatial allocation of resources among regions which
integrate. Spatial allocation processes among regions which are connected by trade and
factor mobility, like in the European Union, should always be the economic relevant
background for regional policy. Therefore the NEG is well-suited for regional policy
considerations. Since the NEG approach is highly aggregated, it offers only a limited
view of the spatial effects of integration. Nevertheless it may be informative for regional
policy to point out under which conditions core or peripheral regions may lose or win
through economic integration and critically evaluating certain aspects of the European
Union regional policy design from this perspective.
The paper is set up as follows. Section 2 resumes key elements of the NEG and presents
the NEG model approach of Ludema/Wooton (1997) which serves afterwards for dis-
cussing the regional policy implications of the NEG. Section 3 firstly examines whether
policy interventions are justifiable from a theoretical perspective and how an adequate3
regional policy design should look like. Subsequently the theoretical results are linked
to the general features of EU regional policy. Section 4 concludes.
2 THE MODEL
2.1 Key Elements of the New Economic Geography
4
The NEG deals with the spatial distribution of economic activities and offers a frame-
work to study the factors which make economic activities cluster together in a few re-
gions, like in the ”Hot Banana” in Europe, while other regions rarely have any.
5 Of
course, the shaping of economic landscapes is not a new topic since already the classical
regional scientists, like von Thünen (1826), Weber (1909), Christaller (1933) and Lösch
(1944), analysed related questions.
6 New is the general equilibrium approach of the
NEG for explaining the emergence of agglomerations in an otherwise homogenous
space. Krugman (1991 a, 1991 b) was the first to develop a general equilibrium model
of this kind. Within this framework elements from traditional regional science and mod-
ern trade theory are combined.
7
Characteristic for economic geography models are the explicit consideration of space
due to interregional transport costs, economies of scale, the microeconomic foundation
of centripetal an centrifugal forces and pecuniary externalities, which are the endoge-
nous outcome of market forces. Economies of scale and transport costs cause imperfect
competition which is captured by monopolistic competition in the line of Dixit-Stiglitz.
8
The peculiarity of this kind of models is their ability to explain the spatial distribution of
economic activities by entirely endogenous location decisions.
In his ”prototype” NEG model Krugman (1991 a, 1991 b) assumes two regions, two
production factors and two production sectors. There are economies of scale in the in-
dustrial sector which employs labour to produce a differentiated good which is mo-
nopolistic competitive and costly traded. In an agricultural sector farmers produce a
homogenous good which is perfectly competitive and freely traded. Fundamental for the
emergence of industrial concentration are economies of scale due to which the profit
maximising manufacturing firms only locate in one region. Under certain assumptions
backward and forward linkages promote a self-reinforcing industrial concentration pro-
cess. The driving force behind this are mobile workers and firms which locate where the
market is relatively large. Against this works the immobility of the farmers. The relative
weight of the centripetal and centrifugal forces – and therefore the spatial equilibrium
structure - crucially depends on the level of the transportation costs, the manufactures’
share of total expenditure and the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated
manufacturing goods.
Krugman himself and other authors modified the seminal NEG model in various re-
spects. In some model variants additional to immobile farmers different factors in fa-
vour of industrial dispersion like non-tradable goods
9 and congestion costs
10 are intro-4
duced. But also elements reinforcing industrial clustering, for example vertical linkages
between industries
11, are considered. But whether the basic structure of the prototype nor
its key mechanisms are questioned by those various modifications. Unfortunately a
common feature of most of the model variants is that they are not amenable to analytical
solutions and exhibit multiple equilibria. In general numerical examples illustrate the
model mechanisms. Therefore, of course, ”A sceptic cannot help reading their numeri-
cal results as special cases of special cases.”
12. But this critics are not appropriate, since
various numerical examples show that the NEG provides general and robust insights re-
garding the interplay of spatial relevant factors and the impacts of integration on the
geographical distribution of economic activities.
13 For working out the regional policy




There are two homogenous regions  A and B and two production sectors, a modern
) (M  and a traditional  ) (T  one. The traditional sector produces a homogenous good un-
der constant returns to scale and perfect competition. There are economies of scale in
the modern sector which produces a wide variety of horizontally differentiated goods
under monopolistic competition. Consumers have love for variety and their preferences
are described by:
(1)
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T C  is consumption of the good produced in the traditional sector and CM  is aggregated
consumption of goods produced by the modern sector. m  denominates the income share
spent on goods of the modern sector. ci  is a single product variety of the modern sector.
K is the large number of potential product varieties and s is the elasticity of substitu-
tion among those. Transport of traditional goods between the two regions is free of
charge. Transportation costs (t )
15 for goods of the modern sector follow Samuelson’s
”iceberg” according to which only  t - 1  units of any unit of good transported between
the regions arrive at the destination. Due to transport costs imported product variants are
more expensive than locally produced ones.
There are two sector specific production factors which total amount is exogenous. Inter-
regionally immobile unskilled workers are employed in the traditional sector and
equally shared between the two regions. The modern sector produces with skilled work-
ers. The skilled workers are mobile between the regions. They are assumed to have dif-
ferent preferences over the location in which they would rather live and work. The indi-
vidual location preferences enters the model by assuming individual wage discount rates
for the wage of the less preferred region.
16 This ends in skilled workers being interre-
gionally mobile on a different. Also perfectly mobile skilled labour is considered. In its
mobility scenarios the Ludema/Wooton approach deviates from Krugman (1991 a,5
1991 b) who only refers to perfectly mobile workers of the modern sector. As will be
pointed out afterwards, including imperfect mobility has far-reaching implications for
the model results and consequently for regional policy.
Regarding the equilibrium some results hold independently of the spatial structure:
- due to free entry and zero profits in the equilibrium higher product prices are re-
flected in higher nominal wages;
- due to economies of scale each firm of the modern sector produces only one product
variety; each firm produces the same amount;
- the number of firms in one region is proportional to the number of skilled workers in
that region; therefore any change of workers located in one region implies a corre-
sponding change of firms in that region;
- each variety of the modern sector is either produced in region  A or B;
- consumers always demand each variety, therefore modern goods are traded between
the regions.
The price for the traditional good and the nominal wages of the unskilled worker do not
differ between the regions when assuming zero transport cost for the traditional sector.
Instead, the real and nominal wages of skilled workers may differ interregional and de-
pend on the spatial distribution of economic activities. The regional distribution of firms
of the modern sector and the skilled labour is decisive for structure of the spatial equi-
librium since the traditional sector is assumed to be immobile. The relative importance
of centripetal and centrifugal forces determines the equlibrium economic geography.
17
Centripetal works the wish of skilled labour to locate where their real income less their
individual wage discount rate is the highest. Thus it is ceteris paribus more attractive to
locate near the largest local market since regional incomes are the higher the less con-
sumers have to relay on imported goods (which are subject to transport costs). This sup-
ports the concentration of the modern sector since the local supply is relatively large
where already more firms and workers of the modern sector are located. This so-called
forward linkage is reinforced by a backward linkage since firms of the modern sector
also might prefer locating where the local market is relatively large. Agglomeration
forces tend to release a self-reinforcing process of industrial concentration. The driving
force for industrial concentration is the mobility of skilled labour. In figure 1 region  A
is supposed to have initially more consumers. This possibly initiates a process of circu-
lar causation leading to partial or complete concentration of the modern sector in region
A.
Against the centripetal forces works a centrifugal force which is the demand of the im-
mobile production factors, i. e. of the unskilled workers and the skilled workers which
remain in the periphery. Due to a lower degree of competition in the less populated re-
gion firms of the modern sector and skilled workers have under certain conditions an
incentive to locate there. Consequently there is a trade-off between being close to the
larger market and lower competition in the periphery.
18 The modern sector will only
concentrate if centripetal forces dominate the centrifugal force.6
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Source: Own diagram.
Due to symmetry it is more or less accidental which region attracts a higher share of the
modern sector. If there are initially more skilled workers in one region, this region will
attract a higher share of the modern sector.
19 Also it is possible that labour migrates to a
certain region since they expect that the other workers will behave in the same way. In
this case the expectations concerning the future economic differences between the re-
gions initiate the process of circular causation.
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Conditional for concentration of the modern sector is that the real wage is higher in the
region where more firms of the modern sector and thus skilled workers are located.
Only then more skilled workers may be attracted – assumed their mobility is sufficient -
by that region initiating the relative or complete concentration of the modern sector in
one region. If instead the real wage would be lower in the region with the higher share
of the modern no industrial concentration process will set in since there is no incentive
for skilled workers to concentrate in one region. From a theoretical perspective it is –
due to counteracting mechanisms – ambiguous which relation holds between regional
share of the modern sector and real wage rate. Real wages, which are the quotients of
the regional nominal wage and the regional price index, differ among the regions if
skilled labour force is unevenly distributed for three reasons.
1. c. p. the higher, the larger the local market is (home market effect),
2. c. p. the higher, the smaller the local market and therefore the regional degree of
competition is since a lower competition enables the firms to charge higher prices
and pay higher nominal wages (competition effect),
3. c. p. in the region with the relatively large market higher as the income share spent
on the less expensive locally produced goods is higher in this region (price index ef-
fect).
Obviously the model structure gives reasons for two wage components which are in fa-
vour of agglomeration: the home market an the price index effect. In opposite to this the7
lower degree of competition in the smaller market encourages the spatial dispersion of
economic activities. The net result of the counteracting wage effects crucially depends
on the assumptions concerning the exogenous model parameter, i. e.  m s,  and t , and
can only by deducted by numerical calculations. Nevertheless we can draw some gen-
eral conclusion that a self-reinforcing process of industrial concentration is the more
probably
21:
- the lower t  is, because for low t  interregional competition is strong since there is
only a relatively small price difference between imported and locally produced
goods (which weakens the competition effect and supports the market size effect),
- the smaller s  is, because in this case locally produced goods are only bad substi-
tutes for the products of the other region (which weakens the competition effect and
supports the market size effect),
- the higher is  m  (which strengthens the price index effect).
From these rather general considerations we turn to discussing the spatial equilibrium.
In the long-term spatial equilibrium there are no incentives to migrate for the skilled
workers. The migration decision of skilled workers not only depends on the wage dif-
ference between the regions but also on the individual willingness to migrate. The
stronger the individual preference for one region is, the larger the real wage differential
has to be for making him migrate to the less preferred region. Since workers have loca-
tion preferences not any real wage difference induces interregional migration. Therefore
interregional real wage differences may exist in the spatial equilibrium.
Dependent on transportation costs and the willingness to migrate various spatial equilib-
ria are possible (see table 1).
22 A symmetric equilibrium describes a spatial structure in
which the firms of the modern sector are evenly distributed among the regions. In an
asymmetric equilibrium there is modern industry in both regions but to a different ex-
tent. A core-periphery pattern describes a spatial equilibrium in which the whole mod-
ern sector is concentrated in one region, the so-called industrial core, while there is only
traditional production in the periphery. If there is an symmetric equilibrium no income
disparities among the regions exist. Contrary, if there is an asymmetric or a core-
periphery equilibrium, nominal as well as real wages for skilled workers are lower in
the region where less skilled workers live. Then, despite identical nominal wages for
unskilled workers in both regions, the real income of unskilled workers is higher near
the relatively large local market, due to lower prices for most products of the modern
sector.
Table 1 shows that six out of nine cases are symmetric equilibria. Only if transport costs
are low and location preferences are weak - or does not exist at all -  migration induced
by real wage differences will create a circular causation mechanism (cases 5, 8, 9). A
core-periphery structure (case 8, 9) is an equilibrium outcome if skilled labour is per-
fectly mobile like in Krugman (1991 a, 1991 b). If skilled workers are only imperfectly
immobile a core-periphery structure is impossible since some of the skilled workers will
never leave their preferred region and migrate towards the region where the modern
sector is relatively concentrated.8
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Case 9: core periphery
structure, interregional
income disparities
Source: Own display based on the results of Ludema/Wooton (1997). * We  do not discuss equilibria for
intermediate transportation costs since there are multiple equilibria for this level of transporta-
tion costs. **see figure 2.
According to the model mechanisms interregional transportation costs are crucial for the
spatial equilibrium. Therefore changes of the transportation costs – may be induced by
integration - affect the economic structure under certain conditions extensively. If loca-
tion preferences are relatively weak the spatial structure may change from a symmetric
equilibrium (case 4, table 1) to a asymmetric equilibrium (case 5, table 1) if transport
costs fall below a certain threshold. If transport costs continue to fall agglomeration
forces become weaker and possibly some of the skilled labour and firms of the modern
sector reallocate to the region with less modern industry.
Figure 2: Level of transport costs and interregional wage relation
decreasing
transport costs
  Interregional real wage relation, skilled labour





Causal for the recovering of this region is the incentive for firms to locate there for tak-
ing advantage of lower prices for the immobile skilled workers. As a consequence the
local market grows and the real wages start to increase. Attracted by the wage increase
skilled labour leaves the economic centre until the real wage differences and the differ-
ent regional share of the modern sector vanishes. Highly stylised the connection be-
tween transport costs and interregional real wage difference takes an ‘u-shaped’ form
which captures the non monotonic connection between transport cost and interregional
income disparities.
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Due to this relation the Ludema/Wooton framework firstly not only explains the rise of
an industrial agglomeration but also its fall. Secondly a spatial structure in which the
modern sector is interregional unevenly distributed but not completely concentrated in
one region is possibly a spatial equilibrium. Those results are more realistic than those
of Krugman’s NEG prototype and plenty of its modifications. Most NEG models pre-
dict a complete concentration of the modern sector in one region for low transport costs.
Unless trade costs are very high or in the case of zero transport costs centrifugal out-
weigh centripetal forces. Furthermore the assumption of imperfectly mobile workers is
more adequate for analysing the European Union regional policy than approaches as-
suming perfectly mobile workers.
With regard to its results and the assumption concerning labour mobility we regard the
Ludema/Wooton model as quite adequate for deriving the regional policy implications
of the NEG. It is relevant for regional policy at it gives hints at the spatial effects of in-
tegration since we assume that integration affects interregional transport costs by re-
ducing barriers to interregional trade.  Of course - despite a more or less realistic mobil-
ity assumption – is the Ludema/Wooton model like all NEG models highly aggregated
and neglects plenty of spatially relevant economic aspects. But the advantage of the
model is having quite general implications despite its simple structure. Anyway, more
complex NEG approaches, for example models with more than two regions, do not es-
sentially alter the results as the interplay between centripetal and centrifugal remains
unchanged.
24
3 REGIONAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In the following the regional policy implications of the Ludema/Wooton model are
analysed with reference to the European regional policy in three steps. Firstly it is ar-
gued that the theoretical framework justifies under certain conditions regional policy
interventions on equity grounds. Secondly the adequate measures for realising regional
policy motives are discussed from a theoretical perspective. Finally the basic concept of
European Union regional policy is critical assessed from the perspective of the NEG.
3.1 Why EU regional policy?
In general, regional policy aims at redistributing income or production factors among
regions. Because of its redistribution elements regional policy can only be executed by
institutions which, like the European Commission, have power over regions charged as
well as favoured by regional policy. Among the most stated justifications of regional
policy interventions are efficiency and equity arguments. Regional policy motivated by
equity considerations aims at equalising regional per capita incomes. Regional policy on
efficiency grounds aims at correction the spatial allocation of resources in order to
maximise the whole production of the concerned regions and to avoid welfare losses.
Regarding integration processes and regional policy measures on a supranational level
another motive joins. In order to promote the acceptance of ongoing integration regional10
policy is implemented for compensating regions which temporarily suffer form deep-
ening integration despite welfare gains for the whole integration area. In this case re-
gional policy implies distributive measures in order to ensure the overall welfare gains
of integration, i.e. a better supply of goods. Whereby, of course, a clear distinction be-
tween the different aims and rationales of regional policy is not possible.
The basis for the regional policy implemented by the European Union has been included
in the European Treaties with the Single European Act in 1986, which marked a new
orientation of regional policy in the European Union. The rationale for regional policy
on the European level goes back to the cohesion objective, which subsumes the political
will to encourage social and economic cohesion. The Commission is particularly
obliged to support convergence, meaning the reduction of regional disparities, among
the regions of the European Union:
”In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall de-
velop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social
cohesion. In particular, the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the
levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least fa-
voured regions, including rural areas (Article 130 a), EC Treaty).”.
Consequently the European Treaties contain a clear obligation for public policies ad-
dressed to reducing regional imbalances unless such a reduction is likely to come about
automatically and within an reasonable period of time.
25 Furthermore, according to the
Commission’s assessment regional disparities are not only bad under equity considera-
tions (”... a poorer quality of life ...”) but also on efficiency grounds (”... under-
utilisation of human potential ...):
26
”Imbalances do not just imply a poorer quality of life for the most disadvantaged re-
gions and the lack of life-chances open to their citizens, but indicate an under-
utilisation of human potential and the failure to take advantage of economic opportu-
nities which could benefit the Union as a whole.” (European Commission 1996, p. 13).
Summarising the attitude of the European Commission we find arguments which fit
with distributive as well as with efficiency motives for regional policy in the course of
economic integration. Let us firstly analyse whether the NEG, i. e. the Ludema/Wooton
model, supports regional policy on efficiency grounds. Afterwards we will turn to eq-
uity considerations.
Contrary to the Commission’s clear-cut  view judging about efficiency losses due to a
certain economic geography is rather difficult form a theoretical perspective. This is es-
pecially true for the NEG framework since it is by no means clear that growing agglom-
eration reduces efficiency. In the presence of forward and backward linkages the market
outcome may lead to inefficiently strong or inefficiently weak agglomeration. Further-
more, for answering the question whether a spatial structure is socially desirable form
the perspective of welfare, which should actually be the yardstick of policy interven-
tions, one has to go beyond mere production considerations. But neither Krugman (1991
a, 1991 b) nor most of the other NEG approaches offer a welfare analysis. However, a11
detailed welfare analysis based on the NEG is hard to do since the formal framework
departs from the walrasian competitive paradigm under three main respects:
27
(a) There are increasing returns and imperfect competition.
(b) With horizontal product differentiation the market equilibrium may over-provide or
under-provide varieties.
(c) While choosing a location firms and workers do not take regard of the external im-
pact of their decision on the profit of other firms or on the utility of other workers.
28
Furthermore the missing welfare considerations go partially back to technical issues.
29
Due to the above mentioned problems the welfare analysis is still a more or less a ‘loose
end’ of the NEG.
30 Agglomeration may be socially desirable form a welfare perspective
or not. Therefore the NEG does not generally support nor reject the efficiency motives
for reducing regional imbalances uttered by the European Commission. Thus it should
be kept in mind, that the Commission cannot think of the kind of economic mechanisms
captured by the NEG when referring to efficiency grounds for regional policy. Anyway,
since efficiency and welfare aspect are crucial in most spatial models one may wonder
on which conceptual framework the Commission’s efficiency arguments concerning the
spatial distribution of economic activities are based on.
Different from the efficiency aspects the equity implications of a certain economic ge-
ography are – at least from a theoretical point of view - definite. The Ludema/Wooton
approach gives reasons for equity oriented regional policy among integrating regions if
integration ends in an asymmetric spatial equilibrium or in a core-periphery structure
with corresponding interregional income disparities. The type of the spatial equilibrium
depends on the transport cost level and the degree of labour mobility (see table 1). Pol-
icy interventions under equity considerations can only be justified if transport costs are
low and skilled labour is highly or perfectly mobile (cases 5, 8, and 9, table 1). In an
asymmetric or a core-periphery equilibrium the income level is lower in the region with
the relatively small market. Since there is no other income than from wages, real wage
differences are an appropriate indicator for regional differences in utility. Hence speak-
ing about regional wage differences is equivalent to speaking about regional differences
in per capita utility.
31
Figure 1illustrates that whether reducing transportation costs by an integration step en-
dangers distribution objectives not only depends on the transportation costs and the de-
gree of labour mobility but also on the initial spatial structure, i.e. if there were regional
disparities before reinforcing integration or not. If the integrating regions are homoge-
nous and transport costs are ”low enough” and labour mobility is ”high enough”, re-
ducing trade barriers initiates a process of circular causation leading to partial or com-
plete concentration of the modern sector (corresponding to case 5 and 8 in table 1). If a
process of circular causation is at work those people with highest mobility will benefit
from agglomeration forces by moving to the region with highest real wage rates. How-
ever, not all production factors are equally mobile. Thus integration is causal for re-
gional disparities. If instead an asymmetric equilibrium already existed ongoing inte-12
gration may support agglomeration or dispersion of economic activities (‘u-thesis’, see
figure 1) when assuming skilled workers to have location preferences. In that case an
integration measure may lead to an increase or decrease of regional income disparities.
Hence, the model supports only for specific parameter choices the widely spread fear
that economic integration at any rate strengthens the economic position of the ”rich” re-
gions and weakens those of the ”poor” regions. It should be kept in mind that Krug-
man’s prototype model leads to different results. When assuming perfectly mobile
workers and heterogeneous regions reducing trade costs in the course of ongoing inte-
gration always strengthens agglomeration forces.
What does all this imply for regional policy from an European perspective? Summing
up it is very difficult to find clear economic rationales in favour of EU regional policy
with reference to NEG models. So far efficiency assessments, not to speak of welfare
results, based on the NEG are to preliminary for justifying regional policy interventions.
Regarding equity motives the Ludema/Wooton framework justifies regional policy in-
terventions while reinforcing integration only under certain conditions. Altogether the
impact of closer integration on the level of income disparities remains ambiguous. Only
if transport costs are low and labour mobility rather high may reinforced integration end
in a asymmetric equilibrium marked by regional income disparities among integrating
regions. From a theoretical perspective those combinations of transport costs and labour
mobility dominate for which political interventions are not necessary on equity grounds
(see table 1). Consequently the NEG gives not a general justification for regional policy
on equity grounds. But admittedly, the result that the model implies only for three out of
nine cases regional policy interventions allows no conclusion about the practical rele-
vance of asymmetric or core-periphery equilibria. The practical relevance of this case is
a – still unsolved - empirical question.
3.2 How to affect economic geography by regional policy?
Because of the still unsolved welfare and efficiency discussion we concentrate in the
following on adequate policy measures to realise equity motives. Anyway, due to rather
ambiguous efficiency effects of integration, equity arguments for regional policy are
certainly more powerful than efficiency arguments.
According to Ludema/Wooton (1997) changes in the transportability of goods as well as
of the factor mobility may affect the location of industry, the spatial allocation of labour
and demand, the trade pattern and therefore regional income disparities. The transport-
ability of goods depends on administrative barriers to trade as well as on the
interregional traffic and communication infrastructure. The degree of labour mobility is
the outcome of administrative migration barriers and the individual location prefer-
ences. Consequently, in aim of realising regional policy motives, the model results  are
primarily relevant for two policy fields. The first is ‘integration policy’ under which we
subsume reducing administrative barriers to trade and labour mobility. The second one
is ‘infrastructure policy’. To be complete, according to the NEG also building a cur-13
rency union is relevant for the economic geography since it affects interregional trade
costs due to reducing exchange rate fluctuations.
Concerning integration policy theory has firstly implications with respect to the inte-
gration intensity. Secondly the model allows conclusions about the advisable sequenc-
ing of opening factor and goods markets. Due to the model structure it is helpful to dis-
tinguish among heterogeneous and homogenous integration partners while discussion
the policy implications. We firstly refer to imperfectly mobile skilled workers.
In the case of heterogeneous regions (regions among which real wages and industrial
density differ) an increase of industrial concentration in the course of ongoing integra-
tion can be prevented if the critical point of the ‘u-curve’ – behind which dispersion
forces gain importance – is overcome. If the transportation costs are low enough, the pe-
riphery gains despite having the smaller market attractiveness due to its lower wage
rates. Consequently, when opening the boarders firms have immediately an incentive to
settle in the periphery. In this case integration is a vehicle for convergence.
The critical point of the ‘u-curve’ is the earlier reached the more extensively adminis-
trative barriers to trade are reduced. An effective reduction of interregional transport
costs gives more importance to the location advantage of the peripheral regions which
are lower nominal wages for skilled workers. Being located near the larger market does
not matter that much if transport costs are low. On the contrary, if barriers to trade are
only reduced on a low scale, persistent – may be large -  interregional real wage differ-
ences are possible. Consequently an integration policy of ”big steps” is advisable on eq-
uity grounds in order to initiate a partial reallocation of the modern sector to the periph-
ery. Admittedly, the recovering of the peripheral regions by ongoing integration can
only be successful if the quality of the interregional infrastructure is sufficient for low
priced transport  of goods.
Furthermore, agglomeration tendencies can be avoided by sequencing the opening of
labour and good markets when regions integrate.
32 If only barriers to trade are reduced
while interregional movement of labour is still restricted, the legally forced immobility
of skilled workers prohibits an increase of industrial concentration in the core region
and therefore further divergence of real wages. Instead, if the reduction of administra-
tive barriers to trade had already led to a strong decrease of transport costs, the opening
of the labour markets is in favour of convergence. For low transport costs the opening
of labour markets among heterogeneous regions gives an incentive for a regional disper-
sion of firms of the modern sector. Hence the model results imply that if heterogeneous
regions integrate the integration intensity as well as the sequence of opening factor and
goods markets can be implemented for realising distributive regional policy motives.
Also in the case of homogenous integrating regions the rise of an asymmetric equilib-
rium and its corresponding wage differentials can be avoided by the design of the inte-
gration policy. Theoretically a direct transition from a symmetric equilibrium with high
transport costs (case 4, table 1) to a symmetric equilibrium with very low transport costs14
(case 6, table 1) is possible, both indicating no real wage differences. If the integration
steps are large enough, agglomeration tendencies in favour of one region can be
avoided. Concerning the timing of factor and goods market opening the same implica-
tions for integration policy as for heterogeneous regions holds. If the level of transport
costs in principle favours agglomeration a simultaneous opening of factor and goods
markets may lead to spatial differentiation which endangers spatial equity. This can be
avoided if firstly only trade is liberalised.
The model implications concerning integration policy in aim of equity can be summa-
rised as follows. An extensive reduction of barriers to trade, which is temporarily ac-
companied by a mobility policy which takes regard of the level of transport costs, is
suited for reducing interregional income disparities. In the case of homogeneous inte-
gration partners the rise of income disparities can also be avoided by that kind of inte-
gration policy. Nevertheless, an extensive reduction of administrative barriers to trade
may not be sufficient for encouraging industrial dispersion. For a given level of admin-
istrative barriers to trade the transportability of goods depends on the quality of the
interregional infrastructure. Therefore infrastructure policy, especially concerning
interregional traffic and communication infrastructure, is a potential policy field for
promoting regional equity.
On of the strong messages of the Ludema/Wooton model for policy considerations is
that an asymmetric equilibrium with corresponding income inequalities must not be per-
sistent. Rather the spatial distribution of economic activities may be influenced by pol-
icy measures. Causal for the non-monotonous relation between transportation costs and
interregional income disparities are imperfectly mobile skilled workers. Instead, when
assuming perfectly mobile skilled workers (like in Krugman’s prototype), decreasing
transport costs do not reduce the concentration of firms in the centre. In these models
there is a threshold of transportation costs below which the agglomeration mechanisms
takes place and is self-sustaining even for continuously decreasing transportation costs.
3.3 NEG Implications for EU regional policy design
At present Europe’s economic geography can be described as an core-periphery-
structure on a large scale. The richest regions of the EU are concentrated in the north
western part of  the continent. At the periphery of Europe we find those countries with
lowest GDP which are Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal to which can be added the
southern part of Italy.
33 Form this point of view geography matters a lot for economic
conditions! Thus, facing the present economic geography of the European Union, we
have to ask in terms of the NEG whether EU regional policy is suited for affecting the
economic geography in such a way that peripheral regions gain modern economies of
scale industries. As an outcome of this income disparities between peripheral and cen-
tral regions would decrease – a development meeting the aim of EU regional policy.
The background for this mechanism is a possibly non monotonic relation between
transportation costs and interregional real wage differences (see figure 1). Anyway, if15
industrial agglomeration were irreversible (like, for example, in Krugman 1991 a) we
should not think about regional policy directed to industrial location decisions but of
interregional redistribution by pure financial transfers.
NEG suggest two ways through which policies can have an impact on the location of
modern firms and skilled labour and thus on regional convergence: Integration and in-
frastructure policy can both help to fulfil regional policy objectives. Although it is a re-
sult of the model that the design of integration policy may affect regional policy it is ir-
relevant in our context since among the current EU member states no more administra-
tive barriers to trade and factor movement exist.
34 Of course, integration policy is of
highest interest in view of the EU enlargement. But we will not discuss this aspect in
this paper. Instead we concentrate on regional policy of the past and at present directed
towards the interregional allocation of resources among the current EU member states.
Admittedly the NEG is very stylised and therefore not suited for a detailed analysis of
the various EU regional policy programmes.
35 Nevertheless, NEG models allow as-
sessing the basic approach of the EU regional policy.
The basic feature of EU regional policy
36 is financial assistance for ‘lagging’ regions,
mainly from the Structural Funds, which are in the actual planning period from 2000 to
2006 equipped with about 195 billion Euro. The Structural Funds are concentrated on
financial aid for regions with an income less than 75 % of the EU average income which
stresses the strong income orientation of the EU regional policy. For example in the
planning period from 1994 up to 1999 about 70 % of the Structural Funds flew towards
relatively low income regions. Subventions financed by the Structural Funds are con-
centrated on three fields. Presently 30 % of the Structural Funds are spent on investment
in infrastructure, mainly on transport infrastructure as well as telecommunications and
energy. Another 30 % of the Structural Funds are budgeted for investment in human
capital, including labour market policy. 40 % of the structural funds finance subsidies to
industry. Regional aid therefore tends to be concentrated on investment and is meant to
increase economic activity in designated regions.
37 Additionally infrastructure and envi-
ronmental projects in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are financed by the cohesion
fund. From 2000 to 2006 the financial amount of the cohesion fund is 18 billion Euro.
NEG has direct implications concerning investment in infrastructure financed by EU
regional policy. The Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund put heavy weight on
transportation infrastructure, in order to promote Trans-European axis, to connect pe-
ripheral regions to the Trans-European networks and to facilitate the international tran-
sit. The emphasis on physical infrastructure in order to promote regional development is
a longstanding Commission viewpoint.
38 This emphasis is justified in part on the
grounds that disparities in infrastructure in the EU are greater than in incomes.
39 The
Commission believes that infrastructures, especially transport and telecommunication,
are major tools to promote regional convergence.
40  But, concerning infrastructure pol-
icy, the NEG sends a different, rather sceptic message. If one assumes the ’u-shape’ re-
lations there are no definite results concerning the impact of declining transportation16
costs on the economic geography and thus on convergence. Declining interregional
transportation costs may strengthen agglomeration or dispersion forces. Thus income
disparities among centre and periphery could increase or decline when improving
interregional infrastructure. Therefore – to speak in terms of the NEG - a crucial prob-
lem connected with infrastructure policy is, that an exact determination of the critical
point of the ‘u-curve’, at which convergence is supported by reducing transportation
costs, is impossible. For such an assessment we have to know whether transport costs
after improving infrastructure are high, low or extremely low. Since no adequate indi-
cator for transportation costs exists any judgement about the level of transportation
costs is more or less speculative.
The theoretical results are even more pessimistic since infrastructure investment may
not only fail to support convergence but could strengthen divergence which would be
diametrical to regional policy motives. Inter-regional infrastructure financed by the
Structural Funds or by the Cohesion Fund may have the unintended effect of attracting
firms from the European periphery to the central regions. This is due to one of the key
mechanism of the model: Facilitating inter-regional trade is like removing trade barriers
which protect firms located in the periphery from interregional competition. The relative
monopolistic power of firms in the periphery – ensured by the natural protection by
transportation costs - decreases if the interregional transportability of goods improves.
Then the competition effect (see page p. 6) loses importance and  the incentive to locate
near the largest market gains dominance. As an outcome of this the current European
core-periphery-structure could be strengthened by declining trade costs. In the course of
this the spatial concentration of modern industries in the core of Europe could increase
whereas the periphery would specialise in constant returns to scale industries, like for
example agriculture and low technology industries.
This rather sceptical message gets even worse if, by modifying the Ludema/Wooton
model, it is differentiated between intra- and interregional infrastructure investment.
Martin/Rogers (1995) show that investment in intra-regional infrastructure contributes
to convergence. Instead, only improving interregional while leaving intra-regional infra-
structure as it is always strengthens regional disparities. As an example for the negative
influence of interregional infrastructure on the economic performance of peripheral re-
gions it is often referred to the Italian Mezzogiorno. It is argued that the improvement of
the Italian traffic infrastructure, mainly financed by EU programmes, worsened the
chance to catch up for the Italian periphery.
41  Without having had a profound industrial
base and a sufficiently large market while facing similar wage structures than in the
north the southern firms lost out to northern competitors. In this case improving infra-
structure was like removing the south’s natural protection from northern Italian com-
petitors.
It should be emphasised that the theoretical result that infrastructure policy may have
the unwanted effect of supporting regional disparities does not imply that infrastructure
policy is always bad from an equity perspective. Crucial for the effect of infrastructure17
policy is its extent since the unintended effect of regional policy may not be expected
for all levels of transport costs. Thus, when transport cost are already low an ongoing
infrastructure improvement may help convergence. With very low transport costs loca-
tion is mainly determined by factor market competition and less by differential in local
expenditures. In this case firms have an incentive to relocate in regions where labour is
relatively cheap and infrastructure policy in search for convergence could be successful.
Altogether there is a danger of strengthening regional inequalities by a wrong ”dosage”
of infrastructure policy measures conducted by the EU infrastructure programmes.
Thus, when having in mind the NEG, it is allowed to doubt the effectiveness of the EU
regional policy strong concentration on infrastructure in search for convergence. All in
all, due to the still outstanding theoretical support regional policy concentration on in-
frastructure should be critically reviewed. Furthermore it should not be ignored by pol-
icy-makers than any improvement of interregional infrastructure will not have a suffi-
cient impact on interregional transport costs (and thus on interregional income dispari-
ties!) if trade impediments due linguistic and cultural differences - despite having re-
moved administrative barriers to trade – are still large among the European regions.
Different from infrastructure policy the NEG model gives no direct hints at the spatial
effects of investment in human capital and subsidies to industries, which are also im-
portant policy fields of EU regional policy. But in the context of the NEG we find an-
other spatial relevant aspect which is not a direct objective of the Structural Funds nor
of the Cohesion Fund but related to all programmes.  This is the fact that interregional
financial transfers – which are quantitatively not negligible - affect market size and pur-
chasing power in the designated regions. Interregional financial transfers have both a di-
rect and an indirect effect on interregional disparities. Firstly, redistributing income to-
wards poorer regions is a direct income transfer to poorer regions supporting conver-
gence. Secondly, regional purchasing power increases when receiving financial trans-
fers. As the market size – and the corresponding expenditure level - is the main force
driving the location choices of modern industries a declining interregional expenditure
gap should give an incentive for firms and workers to relocate towards the region with
increasing expenditure.
42
Let me give some concluding remarks concerning the efficiency objective of EU re-
gional policy programmes. In standard models the efficiency aspect is not clear. More
agglomeration may desirable or not from the aspect of overall efficiency. So, when re-
ferring to the NEG, i.e. to the Ludema/Wooton (1997) framework, the efficiency argu-
ment for regional policy conducted by the European Union is by no means convincing.
The economic theory does not support the Commission’s idea that a core periphery
structure of economic activities is unambiguously bad from an efficiency point of view.
As long as efficiency implications of a certain economic geography are rather vague EU
regional policy in search of efficiency is to reject from the theoretical perspective of the
NEG. Possibly those regional policy interventions reduce efficiency rather than en-
hancing it.  If a spatial allocation is socially desirable policy interventions under cir-18
cumstances induce welfare losses. Different from this the Commission is of the opinion
that an equity-efficiency trade off of regional policy does not exist.
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4 CONCLUSIONS
The aim of the paper was firstly to show what we can learn for regional policy in the
course of integration from the NEG models. Secondly it was analysed what the theoreti-
cal results imply for the EU regional policy in aim of the cohesion objective and under
efficiency considerations. Of course the NEG is only one theoretical approach for ex-
amining the spatial effects of integration. But since no overall framework exists for
dealing with spatial economics we have to rely on those kinds of partial analysis when
thinking about the impact of integration on the economic geography. Despite being
aware of the highly stylised approach of the NEG and its shortcomings, we can, never-
theless, draw some conclusions form the issues captured by this paper. Those concern
the spatial effects of integration on the one hand and their regional policy implications
on the other.
It is still an unanswered question if deepening integration will strengthen the present
core-periphery-structure within Europe and consequently income disparities among the
European regions. Also according to the NEG model developed by Ludema/Wooton the
spatial impact of economic integration is ambiguous. Depending on the circumstances
integration may support divergence or convergence. Whereas convergence is the more
probably the deeper integration and thus the lower transportation costs are. The theo-
retical uncertainty concerning the spatial effects of integration is due to the non-
monotonous relation between agglomeration forces and the transportation costs which is
captured by the ‘u-curve’. Where we stand in this figure is an empirical question of ut-
most importance about we did not speculate in this paper as our considerations are
meant to be theoretical. Despite unsolved empirical - and also theoretical - questions the
NEG is already now informative for policies since it gives new insights about valid and
non-valid justifications of regional policy.
44 Furthermore it allows some guesses con-
cerning regional policy measures.
Regarding regional policy motives the model does not support policy interventions on
efficiency grounds since the efficiency implications of NEG models are still too vague.
From an equity perspective we can find arguments supporting EU regional policy if in-
tegration ends in an asymmetric equilibrium marked by regional income disparities. But
this must not be the outcome of integration. If integration entails convergent or diver-
gent development depends on the level of transportation costs and the degree of labour
mobility. This is a rather interesting result from a theoretical perspective and from the
view of regional policy in practice for at least two reasons. Firstly, the possibility of di-
vergence stands in strong contrast to the neo-classical paradigm according to which in-
tegration always ends in convergence. Secondly, the theoretical possibility of conver-
gence due to integration is contrary to the popular and also from EU policy makers sup-
ported thesis that integration always gives reasons for regional policy on equity19
grounds. Indeed the Ludema/Wooton approach may underestimate the possibility of
convergence due to the fact that it only includes one centrifugal force.
Due to theoretical ambiguity concerning the spatial effects of declining transportation
costs judging about the design of the EU regional policy, i. e. its infrastructure pro-
grammes, is difficult. However, the theoretical results by no means support  the belief
that infrastructure policy is a panacea for regional income disparities. The Commis-
sion’s view that infrastructure in the peripheral regions without doubt is beneficial to
them and supports the reduction of income disparities is not supported by the NEG.
Only if transport costs are sufficiently low the improvement of transport infrastructure
is an adequate tool for reducing regional inequalities. If investment in infrastructure
does not entail an extensive reduction of interregional transport costs EU infrastructure
programmes may support agglomeration tendencies and income disparities. This out-
come would be diametrical to the objective of the European Union regional policies.
Thus it is for the benefit of the low income regions – corresponding to the periphery of
the European Union - that interregional transportation costs decline ”far enough” while
integrating. Concerning the efficiency objective of the Structural Funds the NEG offers
no arguments supporting the Commission’s approach. Anyway, simultaneously tracing
efficiency and distributive objectives, like the European Union does, is problematic.
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Summing up the results, from the perspective of the NEG arguments in favour of the
European Union’s regional policy approach are weak. This holds for the motivation of
regional policy as well as for the policy measures. In view of those findings it is only
consequent to question the general approach of EU regional policy concerning the pol-
icy design as well as its explicitly formulated objectives. In view of the impending EU
enlargement, in the course of which problems of income disparities reach a new dimen-
sion, rethinking the EU regional policy approach should undoubtedly on the agenda.20
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